Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1997

Catherine Brown v. Chris Glover, dba Chick-Fil-A
of Fashion Place, Hahn Property Management
Corporation, a California corporation dba Hahn
Company : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John R. Lund; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; Attorneys for Appellee.
Nancy A. Mismash; Robert J. Debry & Associates; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Brown v. Glover, No. 970694 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1226

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

ORIGINAL
lia D'Alesandro
?terk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ATHERINE BROWN,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,
fJRIS GLOVER dba CHICK-FIL-A
§ FASHION PLACE, HAHN
lOPERTY MANAGEMENT
ORPORATION, a California
irooration dba HAHN COMPANY,

Appeal No. 97f)694-CA
Priority No. 15

Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
CT COURT OF SALTLAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
iLB WILLIAM B/BOHLINGPRESIDING
NANCY A. MISMASH - 6615
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
3575 South Market Street, Suite 206
ft Lake City, UT 84107

jfor Ap|
MOV/ c'^Vrti^l'HM.Sf^l A -iVfAfl
O 9o;< '110$)

uO'fU.M/ for ;<i).«iijoiUJ'Oiii->i

I

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CATHERINE BROWN,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
CHRIS GLOVER dba CHICK-FIL-A
OF FASHION PLACE, HAHN
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, a California
corporation dba HAHN COMPANY,

Appeal No. 970694-CA
Priority No. 15

Defendants/Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. BOHLING PRESIDING

JOHN R. LUND
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Attorney for Respondents

NANCY A. MISMASH - 6615
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
3575 South Market Street, Suite 206
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
Attorneys for Appellant

I,
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING
The parties to this proceeding are identified in the caption of the case. Appellant
Catherine Brown was the Plaintiff below. Respondents Chris Glover dba CHICK-FIL-A
)f Fashion Place and Hahn Property Management Corporation, a California corporation
Iba Hahn Company were the Defendants.
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rv.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-2-2(3)00 and
78-29-3(2)(j). The Order granting summary judgment was entered on July 23, 1997
(R.449-451). Appellant's timely notice of appeal was filed on August 6, 1997 (R.455456).
V,
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are:
1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Plaintiffs Motion
to Continue Trial and Vacate Scheduling Order given the exigent
circumstances (R.449-451; A. 1-3).

2.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by not granting Plaintiffs
Motion to Compel, given that Defendant had previously agreed to provide
discovery responses, prior to ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment
(R.449-451; A. 1-3).

3.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that Plaintiffs
discovery requests could have been done well before the Summary
1

Judgment Motion was filed, given the exigent circumstances (R.449-451A.1-3).
4.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Summary Judgment
as a sanction against Plaintiff when it was Defendant that failed to respond
to discovery (R.449-451; A. 1-3).

5.

Whether the trial court abuse its discretion by not granting Plaintiffs
Motion for Continuance [of the hearing on Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgement] Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(f) (R.449451; A.1-3).

6.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error by granting Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment (R.449-451; A. 1-3).

As to issues number 1 - 5, the applicable standard of appellate review is abusive
discretion in the trial court's decision to deny the Motion to Continue, Motion to Compel
and Rule 56(f) motion. Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 298 (Utah
App. 1994); Crossland Savings v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1242 (Utah 1994).
As to issue no. 6, the applicable standard of appellate review is a review for
correctness, with no deference to the conclusions of the trial court. See: Anderson v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 577-78 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied, 929

P.2d 350 (Utah 1996); Mitchell v. Rice, 885 P.2d 820, 821 (Utah App. 1994); Schurtz
v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah 1991); and Utah R. Civ.
P. 56(c).
VI.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Rules 40(b) and 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are determinative in this
case. Rule 40(b) provides:
ASSIGNMENT OF CASES FOR TRIAL; CONTINUANCE
(b) Postponement of the trial Upon motion of a party, the court may in its
discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, including the payment of
costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon
good cause shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence
of evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence
expected to be obtained and shall show that due diligence has been used to
procure it.
Rule 56(f) provides:
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit
facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as
is just.
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VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition of the Lower Crmrt
This case involves a slip and fall accident which occurred on January 18, 1994 at

Fashion Place Mall near the CHICK-FIL-A restaurant.

Plaintiff was a Dillard's

employee that had been visiting another shop during her lunch hour. On her way back
from lunch, Plaintiff walked down the mall concourse where the CHICK-FIL-A
restaurant was located.

An unidentified CHICK-FIL-A employee was in the mall

concourse offering mall patrons samples of greasy chicken on a tooth-pick.

As she

walked past the CHICK-FIL-A restaurant, Plaintiff slipped and fell on a greasy piece of
chicken.

Plaintiff sustained serious injuries to her back from the slip and fall.

(Complaint and Jury Demand, R.2-3; Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, R. 12-13;
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 177-178). 5
On May 5, 1997 the Court heard oral argument on Plaintiffs Motion to Continue
Trial and Vacate Scheduling Order, Motion to Compel, Rule 56(f) Motion to Stay
Decision and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. At the conclusion, the Court
denied Plaintiffs Motion to Stay, granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
and found that Plaintiff's Motion to Continue Trial and Vacate the Scheduling Order was
4

moot. No decision was made on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel.
B.

Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review.
Defendant CHICK-FIL-A was served with a Complaint and Plaintiffs First Set of

Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents on October 19, 1995
(Certificate of Service, R. 19-21). The Interrogatories consisted of five (5) questions
seeking the name, address, telephone number, and identity of CHICK-FIL-A employees,
specifically the employee distributing samples in the mall on January 18, 1994.
Defendant agreed to provide discovery responses. On April 3, 1996 Plaintiffs attorney
again requested the names of those individuals working at the CHICK-FIL-A restaurant
on January 18, 1994 (Memo, in Support of Motion to Compel, Ex. C, R.244). In June
1996, Plaintiffs case was transferred within the DeBry firm to Mr. Wells (R.88). On
December 9, 1996, Ed Wells withdrew as Plaintiffs counsel of record, and was
subsequently disbarred (R.110). On December 3, 1996, Plaintiffs subsequent attorney
again advised Defendant's attorney that Defendant's answers were late (Memo, in Support
Of Motion to Compel, Ex. D, R.246). Defendant did not answer Plaintiffs First Set of
Interrogatories until March 24, 1997 (Defendant Chris Glover dba CHICK-FIL-A's
Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories, R. 168-171). The answers filed were
incomplete and non-responsive.

On March 31, 1997 Defendant filed its Motion and

5

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 176-219). On April 14,
1997 Plaintiff filed her Motion and Memorandum to Compel Defendant's Answers to
Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories; Motion and Memorandum to Continue Trial and
to Vacate Scheduling Order (R.232-252; 301-324; 325-327); and noticed up 27
depositions of the employees identified in Defendant's answers to interrogatories (R.220227; 232-298) On April 21, 1997 Plaintiff filed Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion to Stay
Decision on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Until Additional Discovery is
Complete; Affidavit of Nancy A. Mismash; and Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion for Continuance Under Rule 56(f) (R.330-331; 332-390; 391-393).
Plaintiff moved for a continuance of the trial date because Defendant failed to
provide the discovery as agreed and because of exigent circumstances (R.304-307),
Specifically, this case was transferred internally within the DeBry firm from George
Waddoups to Mr. Wells to lessen the caseload of Mr. Waddoups because Mr. Waddoups'
son had been diagnosed with cancer and was beginning cancer treatment (Transcript p.
10). Subsequendy, Mr. Wells encountered difficulty with the Utah State Bar on an
unrelated matter and was disbarred.

The file was temporarily transferred to Dan,

Torrence, who was at the DeBry firm 1 - 2 months. The file was then transferred to Al

6

Gray while a new attorney was hired to help with Mr. Wells' caseload. Nancy Mismash
appeared as counsel on March 26, 1997, five (5) days before the Motion for Summary
Judgment was filed (R. 174-175). Because of Mr. Waddoups' familiarity with this case,
he resumed an active role in the case on or about April 9, 1997 (R.304-307). At the time
of the hearing to continue the case, Mr. Waddoups had a trial scheduled for the same
dates as the Brown trial (R.304-307).
VIII.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment in this case.
Prior to the hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiff filed a
motion for continuance. The motion established a good cause basis to continue the trial.
Despite this good cause, the trial court denied Plaintiffs motion to continue and granted
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. In so doing, it abused its discretion.
Simultaneously with the motion to continue, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel
Seeking answers to outstanding discovery. The trial court erroneously found that Plaintiff
Bnould have moved to compel discovery prior to Defendant filing for summary judgment.
The court allowed Defendant to benefit from its abuse of the discovery process by
granting its motion for summary judgment in light of the outstanding discovery. This
7

amounted to an abuse of discretion. In addition, the court denied Plaintiffs Rule 56(f)
motion to continue using the same analysis.
Finally, the court committed reversible error by granting summary judgment in
light of the outstanding discovery. By so doing, the court precluded Plaintiff from fully
investigating her case and marshalling all the evidence necessary to oppose summary
judgment.
IX.
ARGUMENT
A.

As a Matter of Law The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Denying
Plaintiffs Motion for Continuance.
On April 14, 1997 — six (6) weeks before the trial was scheduled to start —

Plaintiff filed a motion requesting that the trial be continued. Plaintiff identified the
following reasons for her request: 1) Defendant CHICK-FIL-A failed and refused to
provide discover responses1; 2) Because Plaintiff did not have Defendant's discovery
responses she was unable to fully investigate her claims; 3) Plaintiffs counsel was
unexpectedly forced to withdraw from the case and was subsequently disbarred; and 4)

*In addition to the Motion to Continue Trial and Vacate Scheduling Order, Plaintiff
also filed a Motion to Compel Discovery seeking answers to her first set of
interrogatories.
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replacement counsel had a trial scheduled to begin on the same day as the trial in this
case. Based on these reasons, the Court should have continued the trial as a matter of
law.
Rule 40(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Upon motion of a party, the court may in its discretion, and upon such
terms as may be just . . . postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause
shown. (Emphasis added).
In Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977) the defendant's counsel was
unable to appear before the court on the scheduled trial date because of a previously
scheduled court appearance. As such, defendant's counsel filed an objection seeking to
have the trial date continued. The objection was never ruled on and the defendant did
not appear for trial. The trial court entered a default judgment against defendant. The
Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded holding, "when counsel has made timely
objections, given necessary notice, and has made a reasonable effort to have the trial date
changed . . . it [is] an abuse of discretion not to grant a continuance." Id. at 376. See
also: Baeras v. Johnson, 373 P.2d 375, 377 (Utah 1962) (despite two prior continuances,
the trial court abused it discretion by denying the request for an additional continuance
so the Plaintiff could be present at the trial).
Plaintiff herein made the necessary "good cause" showing to justify continuation

of the trial. She advised the trial court about the delays with discovery and her efforts
to obtain the information from Defendant (R.301-303; Transcript pp. 7-9). Plaintiff also
advised the Court that her attorney, Mr. Wells, was forced to withdraw and, because of
his disbarment, was prevented from further representing or assisting her with this case.
This unexpected change warranted additional time for replacement counsel to become
fully advised of the case. Plaintiffs replacement counsel timely notified the Court of his
inability to appear for trial on the scheduled dates due to a conflicting trial schedule
(Transcript pp. 7, 10-11). These combined facts constitute "good cause" for continuation
of the trial. As such, the trial court abused its discretion by not ruling on the motion for
continuance prior to ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment.
B,

As a Matter of Law the Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Rendering a
Decision on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff propounded interrogatories to Defendant on October 19, 1995 (R.19-21V

Defendant answered these interrogatories on March 24, 1997 (R. 168-173). The answers:
filed were incomplete and not responsive (R.238-234). One week later, on March 31,
1997, Defendant filed for summary judgment (R.218-219). In response, Plaintiff filed
a Motion to Continue; Motion to Compel; Notices of Deposition; Rule 56(b) Motion to:
Stay; Affidavit of Nancy A. Mismash; and Memorandum in Opposition.

Despitg

Plaintiffs outstanding motions, the trial court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary'
10

Judgment.

As a matter of law, the trial court abused its discretion by rendering a

decision on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in light of the pending motions.
Defendant had thirty (30) days to respond to Plaintiffs interrogatories. Rule 31,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In lieu of a response Defendant could have requested
additional time to respond or sought a protective order. Rule 26(c), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Defendant did nothing. Upon inquiry from Plaintiff, Defendant agreed to
provide the requested information.

Again, Defendant did nothing. When Defendant

finally responded to Plaintiffs interrogatories, the answers provided were incomplete and
non-responsive. As such, Defendant did not meet its duty to respond to discovery.
At the hearing before the trial court, Defendant erroneously argued, and the trial
court erroneously found, that Plaintiff had the duty to compel discovery from Defendant
when answers were not received. Plaintiff argued that at no time was she advised that
Defendant would not answer the interrogatories and, that if she had been so advised, she
would have moved to compel. Within a few weeks of receiving Defendant's answers,
Plaintiff filed a motion to compel seeking complete answers to her interrogatories.
Despite this pending motion2, the Court proceeded to grant summary judgment in

2

Plaintiff s Motion to Compel was scheduled for hearing on May 5, 1997, the same
date and time as Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R.402-403; Transcript p.
52).
11

favor of Defendant holding, "the discovery requested could have been done well before
the summary judgment motion was filed if Plaintiff had utilized the available discovery
procedures." (R.450). This holding effectively sanctioned Plaintiff for failing to compel
discovery earlier and rewarded Defendant for its misuse of this discovery process. This
holding constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.
In W.W. & W.B. Gardner v. Park West Village, 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977) the
Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment against the
defendant for defendant's failure to respond to discovery.

The defendant appealed,

arguing, as Defendant herein argued, that "plaintiff cannot complain, since plaintiff did
not move pursuant to Rule 37[(a)(2)] for an order compelling defendant to answer
interrogatories." Id. at 738. The Gardner court rejected this argument and held:
Defendant may not ignore with impunity the requirements of
Rules 33 and 34, and the necessity to respond within thirty
(30) days, or to request additional time or to seek a protective
order under Rule 26(c). A party to an action has a right to
have the benefits of discovery procedure promptly, not only
in order that he may prepare his case, but also in order to
bring light to facts which may entitle him to summary
judgment.
Id. at 738.
Further, it is well settled that summary judgment should not be granted if

12

discovery is incomplete since information sought in discovery may create genuine issues
of material fact sufficient to defeat the motion. Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740
p.2d 275, 277 (Utah App. 1987) citing Auerbach's, Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376, 377
(Utah 1977).
In Auerbach's defendant moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs counterclaim. At the time of the summary judgment hearing defendant had not responded to
plaintiffs discovery and plaintiff timely filed a motion to strike the hearing because of
this deficiency.
motion.

The trial court proceeded with the hearing and granted defendant's

Plaintiff appealed.

In reversing the trial court, the Utah Supreme court

reasoned:
The granting of the motion for summary judgment was
premature because [plaintiffs] discovery was not then
complete. It was the information sought in the proceedings
for discovery, which [plaintiff] claimed would infuse the issue
with facts sufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment, and sustain his counter-claim.
Id. at 377
The court went on to hold:
When a motion is made opposing summary judgment on the
grounds discovery has not been completed, the court should
grant a continuance or deny the motion for summary
judgment. (Emphasis added).

13

Id. at 377
In this case, Plaintiff received Defendant's answers to interrogatories one we
before receiving Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Upon receipt

Defendant's answers Plaintiff learned, for the first time, that Defendant was not going
provide the names, addresses, telephone numbers, etc. of the CHICK-FIL-A employe
despite Defendant's previous representations that this information would be provided
Plaintiff timely filed a Motion to Compel and responded to Defendant's Motion fd
Summary Judgment with a memorandum in opposition and Rule 56(f) affidavit requestill
additional discovery. Plaintiff also noticed a deposition for each employee identify
Said depositions were scheduled to occur before the trial date.
Defendant's delay in answering interrogatories prevented Plaintiff from fullffl
investigation her claim and ultimately precluded the discovery of facts and witSffl
material to the opposition of summary judgment and to Plaintiffs presentation otHE
case.

And, it was not only Plaintiffs interrogatories that were ignored by DefendSD

Defendant further frustrated the discovery process by its failure to frilly respond to|J|
trial court's scheduling order (Transcript p. 11). Specifically, Defendant did not ideflHI
its witnesses with particularity but rather identified them generically i.e., Hahn PropEH
Personnel, Fashion Place Mall security personnel, and CHICK-FIL-A personnel (R.Htf
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137) thereby denying Plaintiff of the names and identity of fact witnesses necessary to
support her claims.
The trial court got things backwards.

It should have focused its attention on

Defendant's inactions and asked what Defendant had done to comply with the rules rather
jhan what Plaintiff had done.

Further, the trial court should not have allowed

Defendant's failure to comply with discovery to be used to Defendant's advantage in
support of its Motion For Summary Judgment. Under these facts, the trial court should
have deferred the hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment until discovery
was complete. As such, the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the Plaintiff
"could have" compelled Defendant's answers earlier and thereafter ruling on Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
P.

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Denying Plaintiffs Rule 56(f)
Motion to Continue,
As is argued above, Plaintiff timely commenced discovery in this case. Her

fliscovery efforts were severely frustrated by Defendant's failure to timely produce
|nswers. Upon receipt of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff timely
hied her opposition along with a Rule 56(f) motion to continue and supporting affidavit
31.393-396). This affidavit sets forth the specific facts Plaintiff expected to discover.

15

These facts were the exclusive control of Defendant and were material to Plaintiff
theory of the case. As such, the trial court abused its discretion by denying Plaintiff
Rule 56(f) motion to continue.
In Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984) the Utah Supreme Court set fort]
the criteria for a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f). The first consideration is was then
sufficient discovery prior to the motion for summary judgment and, if so, was it affordec
an appropriate response. Id. at 313. And, second, was the discovery sought by the part)
opposing summary judgment for purely speculative facts after substantial discovery. Id.
at 314. See also: Downtown Athletic Club at 278.
In Cox the court found that plaintiff had commenced discovery prior to the filing
of the motion for summary judgment and that these efforts were "precluded by reason of
defendant's failure to respond." Id. at 314. They also found that the outstandirij
discovery dealt with the very issues raised in the motion for summary judgment. As sua
the court reversed the trial courts grant of summary judgment.
Cox is squarely on point with the facts presented in this case. Specifically, one
plaintiffs theories of recovery was that by distributing greasy chicken in a busy rtlffl
concourse, defendant engaged in a method of operation whereby the foreseeable actgH
third parties, i.e. dropping chicken on the floor created a dangerous condition. (R.lffl
16

In order to advance this theory, Plaintiff needed to talk with the employees of CHICKFIL-A and learn:
a.

The skill of the employees serving the chicken;

b.

The policies and procedures actually in place for handing out chicken
samples;

c.

The method for handing out chicken samples, specifically: how often the
servers went over the lease line into the mall common area; how often the
area was cleaned; how far into the mall the cleaning extended; how the
chicken was prepared; how large the pieces were cut; how often chicken
was dropped on the floor; who was served chicken;

d.

The substance of the lease agreement between Defendant Hahn and
Defendant CHICK-FIL-A;

e.

Whether warnings were issued from Defendant Hahn to Defendant CHICKFIL-A regarding Defendant Chick-Fil-A's activity within the mall common
area;

f.

Defendant Hahn Management's responsibilities for the care and upkeep of
the mall common area, including any cleaning records;

g.

The sum and substance of any discussions between Defendant Hahn and
17

Defendant CHICK-FIL-A regarding Plaintiff and the accident in questionand,
h.

The sum and substance of any accident reports for the years 1990 through
present.

Affidavit of Nancy A. Mismash (R.393-396).
Because Defendant did not comply with Plaintiffs discovery request as set forth
above, Plaintiff was unable to fully investigate this claim and, plaintiff was ultimately
unable to present the trial court with the facts necessary to withstand summary judgment.
Accordingly Plaintiff timely filed for her Rule 56(f) motion to continue along with
supporting affidavit setting forth the additional discovery sought.
Given that Defendant had already failed to comply with discovery, the trial Coudl
abused its discretion by denying Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion to allow further discover
before ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
D.

Utah Case Law Requires That Discovery be Completed Before Summarg
Judgment Can be Rendered.
In opposing Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff presented th3

trial court with a number of issues of material fact that would have precluded summaffl
judgment: i.e., how far away from the CHICK-FIL-A restaurant was Plaintiff when sfQ
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fell; what caused her to fall; did the employees of CHICK-FIL-A negligently distribute
chicken samples in the mall walkway; did CHICK-FIL-A knowingly create a danger by
offering chicken samples when the mall was crowded; did CHICK-FIL-A anticipate
pieces of chicken and toothpicks might be dropped or thrown on the floor in the mall
walkway; did CHICK-FIL-A receive complaints about their sampling practice, and if so,
what action was taken. The trial court erroneously concluded that the claims presented
by Plaintiff were no different that those denied as a matter of law in Schnuphase v.
Storehouse Markets, 918 P. 2d 476 (Utah 1996) and granted Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
It is well recognized that issues of negligence ordinarily present questions of fact
to be resolved by the fact-finder. FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d
1332 (Utah 1979). Summary judgement in negligence actions is only appropriate in the
.most clear cut cases. Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 12 (Utah 1987).
The Utah Supreme Court has stated its position on the importance of trial by jury.
In Webb v. Olin Mathison, 342 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1959), the court held:
. . . It is the declared policy of this court to zealously protect the right of
trial by jury and not to take issues from them and rule as a matter of law
except in clear cases.
The Utah Supreme Court has also set forth the following standard to be applied
19

in evaluating a motion for summary judgement:
Summary judgement is proper only if the pleadings, deposition, affidavits
and admissions show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgement as a matter of law. If there is any
doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the opposing party. Thus, the court must evaluate all
the evidence and all the reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the
evidence in a light favorable to the party opposing summary judgement.
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 436 (Utah 1982).
The Supreme Court has characterized summary judgment as a "harsh measure" and
requires that the contentions of the party opposing summary judgement be considered in
a light most advantageous to them with all doubts resolved in favor of permitting trial.
W. W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Mann, 680 P.2d 23, 24 (Utah 1984). In applying these
standards for summary judgment, all of the evidence, inferences, and implications must
be given to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all the benefits
must be resolved in the non-moving party's favor.
The pinnacle argument presented to the trial court was whether or not Defendant's
method of operation, i.e. offering samples of greasy chicken in the mall concourse,
created a dangerous condition such that Plaintiff need not prove actual or constructive
notice of the condition (R.342; Transcript p. 44-45). Specifically, Plaintiff argued thai
the activities of Defendant in this case were more akin the activities of the defendant in
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Canfield v. Albertsons, 841 P. 2d 1224 (Utah App. 1996) than those of the defendant in
Schnuphase (R.342). In order to advance this theory, Plaintiff needed to talk with the
CHICK-FIL-A employees that actually distributed the chicken to the mall patrons.
Plaintiff was precluded from furthering this theory because of Defendant's failure and
refusal to fully cooperate in discovery as argued above.
In a recent Utah case, Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P. 2d 678 (Utah 1997),
the Supreme Court reversed the trail court's grant of summary judgment. The Drysdale
court held:
Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to the court before judgment can
be rendered against them . . . prior to the completion of discover, however, it is
often difficult to ascertain whether the non-moving party will be able to sustain its
claim. In such case, summary judgment should generally be denied. (Emphasis
added).
Id. at 680.
As in Drysdale, Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to complete discovery.
Specifically, she was precluded from establishing that the method of operation used by
Defendant created a dangerous condition. Because Plaintiff was denied this opportunity
to fully present her case, summary judgement was improper and should be reversed as
a matter of law.
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X.
CONCLUSION
In this case, had Defendant provided Plaintiff with answers to interrogatories
Haintiff would have been able to fully investigate her claims and oppose the motion for
Egnmary judgment. Given the outstanding discovery, the trial court abused its discretion
DT4granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment without considering any of
HaintifPs pending motions.
Notwithstanding the inadequacy of Defendant's discovery responses, Plaintiff
Evented the trial court with disputed issues of material fact, as well as a viable theory
KSecovery. Given the general preference to have negligence cases go before a jury, the
HBfl, court committed reversible error by granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
DHiment.
Plaintiff requests that this case be reversed and remanded so that she may present
EffiCase to the trier of fact.
DATED this V

day of July, 1998.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Appellant

toftjL.

NANCY A. MISMASH
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CATHERINE BROWN,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER
OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

vs.
ICHRIS GLOVER, d/b/a CHICK-FIL-A,
INC. of FASHION PLACE, HAHN
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
fcORPORATION, a California corporation
fcb/a HAHN COMPANY,

Civil No. 950905823 PI
Judge William B. Bohling

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for hearing on May 5, 1997. Plaintiff was .present and
^presented by Mr. George T. Waddoups and Ms. Nancy A. Mismash of Robert J. DeBry &
associates. Defendants were represented by Mr. John R. Lund and Mr. Scott K. Wilson of
jhow, Christensen & Martineau. Arguments were presented regarding the following motions, all
8 which had been fully briefed prior to the hearing:
1.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

2.

Plaintiff's Motion to Continue Trial and Vacate Scheduling Order
1

3.

Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion to Stay Decision

The court now being fully advised, and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the
following judgment and order:
1.

Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion to Stay Decision is denied, for the reasons and on the

grounds set forth in the record, including that the discovery requested could have been done well
before the summary judgment motion was filed, if plaintiff had utilized the available discovery
procedures, and that the information sought is not material to grounds for defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment.
2.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted for the reasons and on the

•grounds set forth in the record, including the absence of any meaningful distinction between the
claims presented in this case and the claims that were denied as a matter of law in Schmiphase v.
Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996), Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360
(Utah 1973), and Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175 (Utah 1975).
3.

Plaintiffs Motion to Continue Trial and Vacate Scheduling Order is deemed moot

by the Court's granting of summary judgment and it is therefore not decided.
4.

Judgment is entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff and plaintiffs

action is dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this £ u

day of

\JjjXMr

, 1997.

William B. Bohling, District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S
BRIEF (Brown vs. Chris Glover, et al.) was mailed, postage prepaid, this
luly, 1998 to the following:
R. Lund
W, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
. Box 45000
t Lake City, Utah 84145
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART VI. TRIALS
RULE 40 ASSIGNMENT OF CASES FOR TRIAL; CONTINUANCE
(a) Order and Precedence. The district courts shall provide by rule for the
placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1) without request of the parties or (2)
upon request of a party and notice to the other parties or (3) in such other manner
as the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to actions entitled
thereto by statute.
(b) Postponement of the Trial. Upon motion of a party, the court may in
its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, including the payment of costs
occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon good
cause shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence of evidence,
such motion shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence expected to be
obtained and shall show that due diligence has been used to procure it. The court
may also require the part) seeking the continuance to state, upon affidavit or
under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and if the adverse party thereupon
admits that such evidence would be given, and that it may be considered as
actually given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the trial shall not
be postponed upon that ground.
(c) Taking Testimony of Witnesses Present. If required by the adverse
party, the court shall, as a condition to such postponement, proceed to have the
testimony of any witness present taken, in the same manner as if at the trial; and
the testimony so taken may be read on the trial with the same effect, and subject
to the same objections that may be made with respect to a deposition under the
provisions of Rule 32(c)(1) and (2) [Rule 32(c)(3)(A) and (B) ].

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART VII. JUDGMENT
RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim
or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
^expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a
rihotion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
Supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
(b) For Defending Party. A part) against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor
as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion, memoranda and
affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment
sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories.
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character,
inay be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as
to the amount of damages.
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial
is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings
and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy,
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just.
>Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and
'the trial shall be conducted accordingly.

(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required,
reporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall
ffforth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
Brmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Ivorn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
iall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court maj permit affidavits to
\ supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
fidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
Svided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
mials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
If rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
p . If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
lered against him.

(0 When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
m party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
gkiavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
©lication for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
Sained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
| | r order as is just.
K (g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the
ml at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
E n t e d in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith
K r the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the
SiBnable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur,
Sliding reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be
Budged guilty of contempt.
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RULES:
Rule 4 U.R.A.P

1

Rule 24 U.R.A.P

I

ii.

STATUTES:
Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44 (1953 as amended)
Utah Code Annotated § 44-6-13.5 (1953 as amended)
Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 (1953 as amended)
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(d) and (f)

iii.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by its attorney, Tony C. Baird, Deputy Cache County
Attorney, and tenders its Brief in this appeal pursuant to Rule 24 U.R.A.P. as follows:

JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a3(2)(d) and (f), (1953 as amended). Pursuant to Rule 4 U.R.A.P. the Court has transferred
this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
First Issue: Whether Trooper Kendrick had reasonable suspicion to detain the
Defendant.
Second Issue: Whether Trooper Kendrick lawfully opened the Defendant's car door
to make contact with the Defendant.
Third Issue: Whether the Defendant was properly arrested by Trooper Kendrick.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the factual findings underlying a trial court's ruling on a motion
to suppress under a clearly erroneous standard; State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996); and reviews the trial court's conclusions based on the totality of those facts
for correctness. IdL
A trial court's findings of fact in a criminal bench trial are reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard. See State v. Goodman. 763 P.2d 786, 787 n.2 (Utah 1988). A trial
court's finding is clearly erroneous when it is against the clear weight of the evidence or,
l

although there is evidence to support it, the court reviewing all the record evidence is left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d
932, 935 (Utah 1994).
A trial court's conclusions of law in criminal cases are reviewed for correctness. State
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935, 939 (Utah 1994), State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah
1993). The appellate court decides the matter for itself and does nol defer in any degree to
the trial court's determination of law. Pena, 869 P.2d at 936.

GOVERNING STATUTES
A copy of the following statute cited herein is included in the Addendum to this
Brief:
Utah Code Annotated, §41-6-44, (1953 as amended)

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

While parked on the shoulder of the highway during the course of a traffic stop,
Trooper Kendrick of the Utah Highway Patrol was approached by a concerned
citizen. (R. at 13). The citizen pulled up behind the trooper's patrol car in a blue
Dodge Caravan. He got out of his car, walked up to the Trooper and reported that he
had just observed another car driving all over the roadway, and that this car had
(either) struck (or) almost struck three vehicles. (R. at 32-33). The citizen identified
the car's license plate number, make, color and direction of travel. (R. at 32).
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With this information, Trooper Kendrick ran the license plate number with dispatch
and obtained the registered address. (R. at 24, 35). He proceeded to this address and
2

while nearing the location observed the suspect vehicle, a pickup truck, pulling into
the driveway. (R. at 35-36). He exited his patrol car, now parked behind the pickup,
and approached on the driver's side.
3.

Trooper Kendrick knocked on the driver's side window to try and make contact with
the occupants, the Defendant and his significant other. (R. at 50). After a moment of
no response, Trooper Kendrick opened the door to speak with the Defendant, the
driver. (R. at 51). Trooper Kendrick immediately noticed the odor of alcohol and
other signs of alcohol consumption on the Defendant. He also observed an open
twelve pack of beer inside the pickup. (R. at 56).

4.

The Defendant was invited out of the pickup. The passenger also exited the pickup
and began to confront Trooper Kendrick. Trooper Kendrick decided to call for
backup. He instructed the Defendant to remain and he would be right back. (R. at
60). After returning from calling for backup, Trooper Kendrick discovered that the
Defendant had left the scene and gone inside the house. (R. at 63).

5.

Momentarily, backup arrived, and Trooper Kendrick again initiated contact with the
Defendant by approaching the door to the living area of the residence inside the
garage. By speaking through the doorway, Trooper Kendrick told the Defendant he
could either come out of the house or he was going to come in to continue his
investigation. The Defendant then came out of the house on his own accord. (R. at
63-64).

6.

The Defendant consented to one field sobriety test. Afterwards, he refused any
further tests. He was arrested and subsequently convicted of driving under the
influence.
3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Trooper Kendrick properly acted on information he received by a citizen informant
and upon his own observations when he approached and subsequently arrested the defendant.
The approach and detention of the Defendant were firmly based on articulable reasonable
suspicion that the defendant had violated traffic laws and was driving while under the
influence. Further, Trooper Kendrick was justified in re-contacting the Defendant at his
home in order to continue his investigation. The defendant's conviction should be upheld.

ARGUMENT
First Issue: Whether Trooper Kendrick had reasonable suspicion to detain the Defendant.
The Defendant argues that Trooper Kendrick lacked reasonable suspicion to detain
him. The State agrees that the Defendant was detained, that a level two stop occurred;
however, the State believes, and the record supports, that Trooper Kendrick had reasonable
suspicion sufficient to detain the Defendant for investigation.
"[Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has a 'reasonable suspicion based on
objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.' In determining the
existence of reasonable suspicion, the court must look to the totality of the circumstances."
State v. Nguyen. 878 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Utah App. 1994). "[T]he conduct observed and/or
information relied upon ... must suggest to the officer, in that officer's experience, that
criminal activity may be at foot." Id (citing Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)) (emphasis
added).
With regard to vehicle stops, the Utah Supreme Court has said: u[A]s long as an
officer suspects that the 'driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and
4

equipment regulations,' the police may legally stop the vehicle." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d
1132, (Utah 1994)(citations omitted). The investigating officer may rely upon his own
observations and/or other sources of information to form reasonable suspicion for a stop. In
cases where reasonable suspicion is primarily based upon a citizen informant's tip the stop is
proper if the information is (1) reliable, (2) provides sufficient detail of criminal activity and
(3) is confirmed by the investigating officer. See Kavsville City v. Mulcahy. 943 P.2d 231
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). A tip from an identified citizen informant is extremely reliable. City
of St. George v. Carter. 325 Utah Adv. Rep. 15,17 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The information
provided by the citizen informant should provide enough detail about criminal activity to
support reasonable suspicion (e.g. illegal activity observed, description of vehicle, license
number, and location of incident). IdL To confirm a citizen informant's tip, the officer need
not actually observe the reported behavior; it is sufficient, for example, that he verifies the
suspect car's description and location within a reasonable time of the tip. Id
In the present case, (1) Trooper Kendrick relied upon the eye witness report of a
citizen informant, an extremely reliable source of information. The citizen appeared to be
motivated out of community concern, going out of his way to stop and contact Trooper
Kendrick while he was parked on the side of the highway.
(2) The citizen provided detailed information regarding the incident. One, he
described the Defendant's driving pattern, how the car was driving all over the roadway and
had (either) struck (or) almost struck three vehicles. Two, he provided a description of the
vehicle, including the type and make. Three, he provided the license plate number to the
Defendant's vehicle. And, four, he indicated the approximate location and direction of travel
of the vehicle.
5

(3) Trooper Kendrick also confirmed the citizen's information by locating the
Defendant's vehicle, as described by the citizen, shortly after the tip, just as it was pulling
into the Defendant's driveway.
This information supports a reasonable basis to believe that the Defendant had
committed or was in the process of committing a traffic offense (e.g., improper lane travel,
reckless driving or driving while under the influence). Therefore, Trooper Kendrick had
sufficient facts wherein he could conclude, and articulate, reasonable suspicion in order to
stop and/or detain the Defendant for further investigation. The Defendant was properly
approached and detained by Trooper Kendrick.

Second Issue: Whether Trooper Kendrick was justified in opening the Defendant's car door
to make contact with the Defendant.
The Defendant also argues that Trooper Kendrick performed an illegal search by
opening the driver's side door of the Defendant's pickup. Presumably, this would mean that
the Defendant's arrest was improper as it flowed from the fruit of the poisonous tree. The
State refutes this argument on two grounds. First, the State argues that Trooper Kendrick's
actions were part of a legitimate investigative detention and need only be supported by
reasonable suspicion. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1968)(police officer may, when
supported by reasonable suspicion, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest); United States v.
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227 (1985)(if police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in
specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was or is involved in criminal
activity then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion). As discussed above,
6

Trooper Kendrick
had sufficient facts wherein he could conclude, and articulate, reasonable suspicion in order
to approach and/or detain the Defendant for further investigation. With this, he approached
the Defendant's pickup, knocked on the window, waited, received no response, and then
opened the door with the sole purpose to contact the Defendant to investigate the citizen
informant's complaint. (R. at 50, lines 18 through 25.) Trooper Kendrick's actions,
therefore, were justified and should be upheld as part of a legitimate investigative detention.
Second, even if this Court finds that Trooper Kendrick's actions were a search and
not part of a legitimate investigative detention, this Court should still uphold the Defendant's
arrest and conviction, as any evidence that was obtained as a result of Trooper Kendrick
opening the door would have been ultimately or inevitably discovered by lawful means. See
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,444 (1984) (inevitable discovery rule allows the admission of
evidence if the information ultimately and inevitably would have been discovered by lawful
means). As aforementioned, Trooper Kendrick had reasonable suspicion to detain the
Defendant for investigation. His intent was to speak with the Defendant about the complaint.
Inevitably, Trooper Kendrick would have made personal contact with the Defendant and
detected the odor of alcoholic beverage coming from his person and observed the other signs
of alcohol consumption on the Defendant. The Defendant was at his residence and preparing
to get out of the truck to enter the home — presumably, the Defendant was not going to spend
the night in the pickup and would have exited shortly. When the Defendant exited the
pickup, Trooper Kendrick would be there to make the same observations as when he opened
the door.
Under either of these grounds the State believes Trooper Kendrick's actions did not
7

taint the Defendant's arrest and believes this Court should uphold the same.
Third Issue: Whether Trooper Kendrick properly re-contacted the Defendant at his home.
The Defendant next asserts that Trooper Kendrick conducted an unreasonable
warrantless search or seizure of the defendant in violation of Article I, section 14 of the Utah
State Constitution when he re-contacted the defendant at his home. Presumably, this would
mean that the Defendant's arrest was improper as it flowed from the fruit of the poisonous
tree. The facts in this case do not support such a conclusion.
Firstly, there never was an entry into the home; the officers merely approached the
home's entrance at the garage and spoke to the Defendant through the door. Granted, the
Defendant was told by Trooper Kendrick that he would enter the home if the Defendant did
not come out but as the situation fleshed out, neither Trooper Kendrick nor any other officer
entered the home. The Defendant came out on his own accord and subjected himself to
further investigation by Trooper Kendrick. Therefore, there was not a warrantless entry into
the Defendant's home and the Defendant's arrest was proper.
Secondly, even if this Court finds that Trooper Kendrick entered the Defendant's
home when he stood in the garage at the door entering the living area, this Court should still
uphold the Defendant's arrest. The actions of the officer were fully justified. Trooper
Kendrick had the authority to detain the defendant based on the facts heretofore discussed.
*[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot, a brief stop and detention is
justified." Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968). The
defendant disobeyed the officer's order to remain thereby creating the need for the officer to
SP-contact him. A suspect cannot openly thumb his nose at an investigating officer by
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disobeying his order, entering his home and then feigning constitutional protections. To
uphold such logic would frustrate legitimate law enforcement investigations and encourage
dangerous conduct by detainees. See, e.g.. U.C.A. § 44-6-13.5("Failure to respond to
officer's signal to stop") and U.C.A. § 76-8-305 ("Interference with arresting officer").
Thirdly, the officer's entry was justified under the "exigent circumstances" exception
to the warrant requirement. An officer may enter a home without a warrant when he has
probable cause and an exigent circumstance exists. See State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9,15-16
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). In the present case, Trooper Kendrick had probable cause to believe
that the Defendant had committed the offense of driving while under the influence. (1) He
had received reliable information from a citizen informant of the Defendant's driving pattern
- swerving on the roadway and nearly striking three vehicles — and confirmed that indeed
the Defendant was driving the pickup. (2) In the Defendant's pickup, he observed an open
twelve pack of beer. (3) He also observed the strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming
from the pickup and the Defendant's person. (4) He noticed that the Defendant's speech was
slurred, face flaccid and ptosis of the eyes. (R. at 56-57). (5) The Defendant was somewhat
clumsy and dropped his wallet and other papers. (R. at 57). (6) The Defendant admitted to
drinking alcohol. (R. at 59). (7) The Defendant attempted to avoid any further questioning
or investigation by Trooper Kendrick. (R. at 60-65). And, (8) the Defendant appeared
unstable on his feet. (R. at 61).
Further, in the present case, an exigent circumstance existed. "Exigent circumstances
are those 'that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry...was necessary to
prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence,
the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law
9

enforcement efforts.'" Beavers. 859 P.2d at 18.
This case satisfies several of the factual scenario of exigent circumstances proposed
by Beavers. 1) Preservation of Evidence: Alcohol dissipates from the body over time; it is
crucial to perform relevant tests shortly after the stop. 2) Escape of Suspect: The defendant
left the scene after being told by the officer to "stay put." 3) Frustration of Law Enforcement
Efforts: The defendant's departure from the scene after being ordered to stay violates U.C.A
§ 76-8-305, ("Interference with an arresting officer").
Therefore, because Trooper Kendrick entered the home under the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, the Defendant's arrest was proper.

CONCLUSION
Officer Kendrick properly acted on information he received by a citizen informant
and upon his own observations when he approached and subsequently arrested the defendant.
The approach and detention of the Defendant were firmly based on articulable reasonable
suspicion that the defendant had violated traffic laws and was driving while under the
influence. Further, Trooper Kendrick was justified in re-contacting the Defendant at his
home in order to continue his investigation. The defendant's conviction should be upheld.

DATED this ^Oday of June, 1998.

Tony C. Baird
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UT ST § 41-6-44, Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or with specified or unsafe blood
alcohol concentration-Measurement of blood or breath alcohol-Criminal punishment-Arrest
without warrant-Penalties-Suspension or revocation of license

section adopted in compliance with Section
41-6-43; and

Utah Code § 41-6-44
WESTS UTAH CODE
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND
REGULATIONS
ARTICLE 5. DRIVING WHILE
INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS
DRIVING
Current through End of 1997 General and 1st and
2nd Sp. Sess

§ 41-6-44. Driving under the influence of
alcohol, drugs, or with specified or unsafe
blood alcohol concentration-Measurement
of blood or breath alcohol-Criminal
punishment-Arrest
without
warrantPenalties-Suspension or revocation of
license
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "prior conviction" means any conviction for
a violation of:
(i) this section;
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under
Subsections (9) and (10);
(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or
alcohol-related reckless driving adopted in
compliance with Section 41-6-43;
(iv) automobile
76-5-207; or

Pagel

homicide

under

Section

(c) the standard of negligence is that of simple
negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of
care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent
person exercises under like or similar
circumstances.
(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual
physical control of a vehicle within this state if
the person:
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration
of.08 grams or greater as shown by a chemical
test given within two hours after the alleged
operation or physical control; or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug,
or the combined influence of alcohol and any
drug to a degree that renders the person incapable
of safely operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating
this section is or has been legally entitled to use
alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of
blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210
liters of breath.
*11516 (3) A person convicted the first or
second time of a violation of Subsection (2) is
guilty of a:
(a) class B misdemeanor; or

(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other
state, the United States, or any district,
possession, or territory of the United States which
would constitute a violation of this section or
alcohol-related reckless driving if committed in
this state, including punishments administered
under 10 U.S.C. 815;
(lb) a violation of this section includes a
violation under a local ordinance similar to this

(b) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(i) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another
as a proximate result of having operated the
vehicle in a negligent manner; or
(ii) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the
vehicle at the time of the offense.
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UT ST § 41-6-44, Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or with specified or unsafe blood
alcohol concentration-Measurement of blood or breath alcohol-Criminal punishment-Arrest
without warrant-Penalties-Suspension or revocation of license

(4)(a) As part of any sentence imposed the court
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory
jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive
hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part
of a jail sentence, require the person to work in a
community-service work program for not less
than 24 hours.
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or
community-service work program, the court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in an
assessment and educational series at a licensed
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility,
as appropriate; and
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(d) The court may order the person to obtain
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility.
(6)(a) A third or subsequent conviction for a
violation committed within six years of two or
more prior convictions under this section is a:
(i) class A misdemeanor except as provided in
Subsection (ii); and
(ii) third degree felony if at least:
(A) three prior convictions are for violations
committed after April 23, 1990; or
*11517 (B) two prior convictions are for
violations committed after July 1,1996.

(ii) impose afineof not less than $700.
(d) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993,
he court may order the person to obtain treatment
at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility determines that the person
has a problem condition involving alcohol or
drugs.
(5)(a) If a person is convicted under Subsection
(2) within six years of a prior conviction under
this section, the court shall as part of any sentence
apose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than
•0 consecutive hours.
|(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part
> a jail sentence, require the person to work in a
immunity-service work program for not less
180 hours.
c

j| ) In addition to the jail sentence or
Dromunity-service work program, the court shall:
p) order the person to participate in an
ssment and educational series at a licensed
Pnol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility,
TPropriate; and
1,1 ,#

mpose afineof not less than $800.

(b)(i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall as
part of any sentence impose a fine of not less than
$2,000 and impose a mandatory jail sentence of
not less than 720 hours.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to all or part
of a jail sentence, require the person to work in a
community-service work program for not less
than 240 hours, but only if the court enters in
writing on the record the reason it finds the
defendant should not serve the jail sentence.
Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation program approved
by the court may be a sentencing alternative to
incarceration or community service if the program
provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and
long-term closely supervised follow-through after
the treatment.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or
community-service work program, the court shall
order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol
or drug dependency rehabilitation facility.
(c) Under Subsection (a)(ii) if the court suspends
the execution of a prison sentence and places the
defendant on probation the court shall impose:
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500;
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(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than
1,000 hours; and
(iii) an order requiring the person to obtain
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation program providing intensive care or
inpatient treatment and long-term closely
supervised follow-through after treatment.
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or drug dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain,
mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility;
or do a
combination of those things, apply to a conviction
for a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45
under Subsection (9).

(7)(a) The mandatory portion of any sentence
required under this section may not be suspended
and the convicted person is not eligible for parole
or probation until any sentence imposed under
this section has been served. Probation or parole
resulting from a conviction for a violation under
this section may not be terminated.

(ii) The court shall render the same order
regarding education or treatment at an alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation facility, or both,
in connection with a first, second, or subsequent
conviction under Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45
under Subsection (9), as the court would render in
connection with applying respectively, the first,
second, or subsequent conviction requirements of
Subsections (4), (5), and (6).

(b) The department may not reinstate any license
suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction
under this section, until the convicted person has
liirnished evidence satisfactory to the department
that:

(b) Any alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation program and any community-based
or other education program provided for in this
section shall be approved by the Department of
Human Services.

(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency
assessment,
education,
treatment,
and
rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed
after July 1, 1993, have been completed;

(9)(a)(i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea
of guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of
Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under
Section 41-6-43, or of 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction
of, or as a substitute for, an original charge of a
violation of this section, the prosecution shall
state for the record a factual basis for the plea,
including whether or not there had been
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination
of both, by the defendant in connection with the
violation.

(ii) all fines and fees including fees for
restitution and rehabilitation costs assessed
against the person have been paid, if the
conviction is a second or subsequent conviction
for a violation committed within six years of a
prior violation; and
*11518 (iii) the person does not use drugs in any
abusive or illegal manner as certified by a
licensed
alcohol
or
drug
dependency
rehabilitation facility, if the conviction is for a
third or subsequent conviction for a violation
committed within six years of two prior violations
committed after July 1, 1993.
(8)(a)(i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5),
and (6) that require a sentencing court to order a
convicted person to: participate in an assessment
and educational series at a licensed alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in
the discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol

(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts
that shows whether there was consumption of
alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant, in connection with the violation.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before
accepting the plea offered under this subsection of
the consequences of a violation of Section
41-6-44.6 or of 41-6-45.
(c) The court shall notify the department of eacMj
conviction of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-451
entered under this subsection.
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> (10) A peace officer may, without a warrant,
"arrest a person for a violation of this section when
Ihe officer has probable cause to believe the
Violation has occurred, although not in his
presence, and if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by the
lerson.
•11519 (ll)(a) The Department of Public Safety
hall:
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a
person convicted for the first time under
Jubsection (2);
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person
^onvicted of any subsequent offense under
lubsection (2) if the violation is committed
vithin a period of six years from the date of the
jrior violation; and
[(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as
frdered by the court under Subsection (12).
b) The department shall subtract from any
pension or revocation period the number of
ys for which a license was previously
ended under Section 53-3-223, if the previous
ispension was based on the same occurrence
|on which the record of conviction is based.
|12)(a) In addition to any other penalties
tovided in this section, a court may order the
gerator's license of a person who is convicted of
violation of Subsection (2) to be suspended or
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revoked for an additional period of 90 days, 180
days, or one year to remove from the highways
those persons who have shown they are safety
hazards.
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the personfs
license under this subsection, the court shall
prepare and send to the Driver License Division
of the Department of Public Safety an order to
suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges
for a specified period of time.
Amended by Laws 1994, c. 159; Laws 1994, c. 263; Laws
1996, c. 71, § 1, eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 220, § 1,
eff July I 1996; Laws 1996, c. 223, § 2, eff. July 1, 1996;
Laws 1997, c. 68, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997.
HISTORICAL NOTES
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Section 3 of Laws 1996, c. 220, provides:
"If this bill and S.B. 4 [Laws 1996, c. 71], DUI
Amendments, both pass, it is the intent of the Legislature
that the amendments in Subsection 41-6-44(6) in this bill
supersede the amendments to Subsections 41-6-44(6) and (7)
in S.B. 4."
Section 5(1) of Laws 1996, c. 223, provides:
"If this bill and H.B. 3 [Laws 1996, c. 220], Driving Under
the Influence Penalty Enhancement, both pass, it is the intent
of the Legislature that the amendments to Subsection
41-6-44(6) in H.B. 3 supersede the amendments to
Subsection 41-6-44(6)(a), (6)(b), and (7) in this bill."
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